دانلود کتاب Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison

This book is about the relationship between corporate governance regimes and labor management. It examines how finance and governance influence employment relationships, work organization, and industrial relations by means of a comparative analysis of Anglo-American, European and Japanese economies. The starting point is the distinction widely found in the corporate governance, business systems, and political economy literature between countries dominated by 'shareholder value' conceptions of corporate governance and those characterized by 'stakeholder' regimes. By drawing on a wide range of countries, the book is able to demonstrate the complexities of corporate governance arrangements and to present a more precise and nuanced exploration of the linkages between governance and labor management. Each country-based chapter provides an analysis of the evolution and key characteristics of corporate governance and then links this to labor management institutions and practices. The chapters cover the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain, with each written by a leading academic expert in the field. By providing a historical review of the evolution of national systems, the contributors provide judicious evaluations of the current state and future directions of national governance and labor relations systems. Overall, the book goes beyond the 'complementaries' between governance and labor management systems identified in recent literature, and attempts to identify casual relationships between the two. It shows how labor management institutions and practices may influence finance and corporate governance systems, as well as vice versa. The contributions to this book illuminate current debates about the determinants of corporate governance, the convergence of national 'varieties of capitalism', and the impact of corporate governance on managerial behavior. The book highlights the complexities of corporate governance systems and refines the distinction between market/outsider and relational insider systems.