جزییات کتاب
Some aspects of Ockham's metaphysical and logical systems are examined: most importantly the relationship between nominalism and essentialism. It is claimed that in Ockham's philosophy in general, but in his logical system in particular, nominalism plays a central role. Also it is maintained that, generally speaking, a theory of essentialism is not compatible with nominalism. In order to ascertain whether they are also incompatible in Ockham's mind, after taking into account other aspects of Ockham's philosophy, an analysis is performed of Ockham's logical system and particularly his modal logic with special emphasis on the mode of necessity. With the help of modern discussions of modal logic and essentialism, a series of arguments are developed against the compatibility of Ockham's nominalism with essentialism. Ockham's essentialism is shown to be based not on a notion of real essences, but on the notion of nominal essence in order for such a notion to be expressed by Ockham, he must make use of essentialist language, but he leaves it completely devoid of ontological content.