دانلود کتاب El Leviatan como Prosopopeya. Hacia una nueva teoria del conflicto en Hobbes

Interpretations that focus only on motivations of individuals in abstract terms often underestimate the importance of the world of systems in the structuration of the Leviathan. Without a corporatist approach, we are left with a picture –like the one in the frontispiece– where the person borne by the sovereign is linked univocally and immediately to the undifferentiated mass of subjects. In contrast, our dissertation will argue that the exposition of the nature and functioning of the internal systems is essential for a comprehensive account of political conflict in Hobbes’s thinking. Instead of identifying the collision of material interests of individuals, or their irreconcilable ideological differences, as the cause of political conflict, we would rather concentrate our attention on the structural identity of the State and its internal corporations. This does not mean to leave out of our consideration individual behavior. In fact, persons by fiction speak and act through natural persons. What we propose is to embed this particular motivations into a world of corporations and fictions. For instance, the ambition of the representative of the city of London (or the commander in chief of the army, or the leader of a faction) and his associates would not be intelligible if we fail to heed the similarity between this corporations and the State. The fact that both offices are so alike make competition and defiance inevitable. But, why would Hobbes enable this kind of dangerous resemblance?
In this regard, our main objective could be formulated as follows: by extending the regular structure to dependent corporations, Hobbes is looking for a way of attributing responsibility for the actions and words of those corporations to significant political agents, that is, to their representatives. Thus, he intends to order political conflict as a battle of regular systems, i.e., as a struggle between fictions held always by accountable agents. Wherever there is a representative (or an assembly of representatives), there is someone who can and must own up the actions done in name of a fictitious person or corporation. In sum, Hobbes admits the mentioned genetic resemblance of the systems, even at risk of encouraging their auto-perception of being “lesser Commonwealths”, because he wants to confine political conflict to a regular morphology, namely, to an antagonism between representatives who speak and act in name of a group.
Rather, what he fears most –we will claim– is an irregular conflict where the State has to confront a tumultuous mob and nobody takes responsibility of political defiance. Or, what is worse, the concealment of a corporative leader’s ambition under the facade of a spontaneous outburst of the multitude. In effect, the irregularity cloak could make us believe that the deposition of Charles I was in hands of a fluctuating and unaccountable category such as the ‘people of London’, and that numerous actions of an inarticulate multitude contingently coincided in that result. Therefore, when Hobbes demands regularity, it is because he is looking for political accountability. Formulated in negative terms, Hobbes’s motto would be: no corporation without its anchorage in the figure of a representative.