دانلود کتاب Against Self-ownership: A Philosophical Reflection

This paper argues that the libertarians simply cut off the contingency (between not-
yet-persons and persons) into time-slice account. They do not want to deal with a problem
such as: how could the structure of Self-Ownership (SO) embed in persons? Indeed, the
libertarians arbitrarily ignore who the owner of not-yet-persons is if a child is not a person
yet. On the other hand, if God confers people’s property in person, it consequently means that
a believer of SO is supposed to also believe in God. Insofar as a believer of SO cannot explain
what the source of SO is, he needs to rely on a Lockeian explanation where God confers
human with a property in person. There are two general libertarian reasons for this. First of
all, the libertarian notion of slavery, as Cohen encounters it. Secondly, as Narveson conceives,
since each individual has separate life, therefore every interaction between individuals is
supposed to be based on mutual benefits. Therefore, the more appropriate way to encounter
the thesis of SO is by cutting the bridge between the notion of owning self and a matter of
moral right. Instead of cutting the bridge, Cohen widens his rejection by proposing another
institution. Nevertheless, Cohen does nothing to explain what the structure of the bridge
consist in and what the foundation for such a bridge is.